How to Safely Access GitHub Secrets Without CI Invocation?

GitHub introduced Secrets specifically designed for use within their Continuous Integration (CI) pipelines. The convenience of reading secrets directly in a workflow via:

env: # Or as an environment variable
  super_secret: ${{ secrets.SuperSecret }}

This approach, while straightforward with CI/CD systems like GitHub Actions and the gh CLI tool (https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/using-secrets-in-github-actions), poses a significant security risk if misused outside of these controlled environments.

Here’s why accessing secrets without CI invocation is challenging:

1. Lack of Encrypted Storage - Secrets are not stored in encrypted form on GitHub itself, meaning they can be easily exposed by any unauthorized entity with access to the repository or even through a simple web browser view (https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/using-secrets-in-github-pages).
2. Explicit Leak Potential - Once visible, secrets are readily accessible via GitHub’s various interfaces without additional authorization or verification steps as would be required within the CI environment (https://docs.gharchive.org/#!/action/get_repository_secret/). This makes it tempting for unauthorized parties to misuse these sensitive pieces of information, intentionally leading them into a breach situation.
3. Current Workflow Limitations - There is no native feature in the current GitHub setup that allows secrets’ values to be displayed directly without invoking an authenticated CI process (https://github.com/cli/cli/discussions/3397). Even with a proposed ticket, it was closed due to its implications for security and trust within workflows:
   • No Secret Viewing Outside of Workflow – Without the structured environment provided by CI pipelines like GitHub Actions or gh, there are no built-in methods available on standard web interfaces. This includes both repository views (https://docs.githubwebpage.com/#) and local system access via command line tools, which do not show secrets without action execution contexts that trigger a workflow run with secret read permissions.
   • Closure of Security-Focused Request – Proposals for implementing such functionality are generally closed to uphold security best practices within the GitHub environment (https://github.com/cli/cli/issues). The primary concern is preventing unautlearnced access and misuse which would undermine trust in how secrets should be handled, especially when they serve sensitive roles like API tokens or database credentials for third-party services integration with repositories that may have broader reach beyond the GitHub infrastructure.
   • Security Measures to Prevent Unauthorized Access – The current understanding and best practice advocate keeping secret management tightly controlled within secure CI workflows, ensuring only authenticated actions can access these sensitive items (https://docs.githubwebpage.com/en). This helps maintain a separation of concerns where the environment for handling secrets is distinct from public-facing repository interactions or general system environments that are not governed by strict authentication and authorization checks inherent to CI processes.

As it stands, accessing GitHub Secrets without invoking any form of Continuous Integration action remains outside recommended security practices due to the risk factors mentioned above—primarily because doing so would directly conflict with principles designed into their secure handling mechanisms: confidentiality and controlled accessibility within authenticated processes.